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NOTES.
CONCEALMENT OF AN INFORMANT'S IDENTITY-
A GOYERNMENTAL PRIVILEGE.
Historically, the inducement of an informant to convey his informa-
tion finds roots in the practice of approvement, in which a person
charged with a felony would confess his guilt and then offer to name
other criminals. Should the others be convicted, the informant would
be pardoned.2 Another practice designed to encourage the informant
was the English statutory precedent to the modern qui tam action:
which gave an informant the right to participate in the proceeds of
any penalty imposed.3 The English law early recognized the govern-
ment's privilege of non-disclosure of its informants as essential to any
effective use of informants in law enforcement.4 That this privilege
exists in America is evidenced by a plethora of case authority.'
It is clear that government has some privilege to withhold the iden-
tity of its informants. This privilege is, in substance, that government
officials will not be compelled to disclose the identity of an inform-
1. Cf. Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 594 (1878); Guthrie v. Commonwealth, 171 Va.
461, 198 S.E. 481 (1938).
See II Pollack & Maitland, History of English Law 631 (1895). See also Don-
nelly, Judicial Control Of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, And Agent Provo-
cateurs, 60 Yale L.J. 1091 (1951).
2. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943). CfL 38 Stat. 277
(1914), 21 U.S.C. § 183 (1952) (narcotics).
3. Holdsworth, History of English Law 355-58 (2d ed. 1937). See Donnelly,
supra note L
4. See the statement of Eyre, CJ., in Hardy's Case, 24 How. St. Tr. 808 (1794)
that: "[T]here is a rule which has universally obtained on account of its impor-
tance to the public for the detection of crimes, that those persons who are the
channel by means of which that detection is made, should not be unnecessarily
disclosed...."
5. In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U.S. 532 (1895); United States v. Conforti,
200 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953); United States v.
Li Fat Tong, 152 F.2d 650 (2d. Cir. 1945); Shore 1. United States, 49 F.2d 519
(D.C. Cir. 1931); Goetz v. United States, 39 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1930); Segurola
v. United States, 16 F.2d 563 (1st Cir. 1926); Smith v. United States, 9 F.2d 386
(9th Cir. 1925); Tobin v. Gibe, 13 F.R.D. 16 (1952); People v. Alaniz, 149 CaL
App. 2d 560, 309 P.2d 71 (1957) ; Anderson v. State, 72 Ga. App. 487, 34 S.E.2d
110 (1945); Brewster v. Commonwealth, 278 S.W.2d 63 (Ky. 1955); State v.
Soper, 16 Me. 293 (1839); Perry v. State, 150 Miss. 293, 116 So. 430 (1928);
State v. Bailey, 320 Mo. 271, 8 S.W.2d 57 (1928)- Sadler v. State, 118 Tex. Crim.
318, 40 S.W.2d 91 (1931).
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ant unless it appears essential to the proper disposition of justice.'
The privilege is one belonging to the government, i.e., invocable by
government officials who are called upon as witnesses to disclose the
source of their information.7 Whether disclosure will be compelled is
dependent on balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of
information against the individual's right to prepare his case.8 The
basic rights of an accused to a fair trial or of a party litigant to a
broad scope of discovery may well preclude any valid claim of the
privilege in a particular instance. Therefore, although there is some
authority holding that this is an absolute privilege to be determined
by the government,' it would seem that allowance of the privilege in
any particular instance is a matter reasonably left to judicial discre-
tion.10 The purpose of this note is to indicate the exceptions and
limitations of the privilege, in this way setting forth the basic nature
of the privilege as it exists today.
If an informant conveyed to the police information indicating that
X was engaged in illegal drug traffic, and if the police acting on this
"lead" or "stimulus" observed such activity, i.e., the sale of drugs,
then at trial the accused could not demand disclosure of the infor-
mant's identity." The informant's information was not used as evi-
dence in the trial, and the informant, therefore, could in no way be
characterized as a witness against the accused. Thus, the accused
could not assert that there was any infringement upon his right to
confrontation." Neither, in this situation, could he claim that his
6. Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); Cannon v. United States, 158
F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1946); United States v. Li Fat Tong, 152 F.2d 650 (2d Cir.
1945); United States v. Bortlik, 119 F. Supp. 425 (M.D. Pa. 1954).
7. In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U.S. 532 (1895); Wilson v. United States,
59 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1932); State v. Hoben, 36 Utah 186, 102 Pac. 1000 (1909).
See Underhill, Criminal Evidence § 287 (3d ed. 1923).
8. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
9. Worthington v. Scribner, 109 Mass. 487 (1872) (the question of how far and
under what circumstances the names of informers and the channels of communi-
cation shall be known is in the absolute discretion of the government); Marks v.
Beyfus, L.R. 25 Q.B.D. 494 (1890) (the privilege is a rule of law which must be
applied as such by the trial judge).
10. In Boudin v. Dulles, 136 F. Supp. 218 (D.C.D.C. 1955), afrd on other
grounds, 235 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1956), the court states at 222, that:
"When the basis of action by any branch of the government remains hidden
from scrutiny and beyond practical review, the seeds of arbitrary and irrespon-
sible government are sown. More and more the courts have become aware of the
irreparable damage which may be ... wrought by the secret informer and face-
less talebearer whose identity and testimony remains locked in confidential fIes."
11. See, e.g., Shore v. United States, 49 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (holding that
where the informant furnished only an "impulse" the defendant cannot demand
disclosure).
12. Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1920); Dear Check Quong, 160
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basic right to a fair trial was violated, and hence there could be no
effective plea of lack of due process. The labels courts use to charac-
terize these and similar situations are "lead" and "stimulus," and it
is clear that they are only labels. They are names attached to situa-
tions in which the evidence of the case, the proof in trial, does not
consist of the informant's communications, and hence there is no
violation of the accused's rights to confrontation or to a fair trial.
It is in this light that one may well draw an analogy between the
right to confrontation and the hearsay rule of exclusion prohibiting
the introduction into court of statements made out of court by one
other than a witness. Both are founded upon similar considerations,
i.e., that a litigant should be able to cross-examine witnesses presented
against him, and incidentally that the court should be able to observe
the manner and demeanor of witnesses whose testimony is to be used
as evidence.13 Where evidence is admitted under one of the many
exceptions to the hearsay rule there is a concomitant denial of the
opposing party's right to confrontation. Similarly, where the govern-
mental privilege of non-disclosure is afforded, the defendant's right
to confrontation is denied. The exceptions to the hearsay rule are
based on necessity and probability of trustworthiness." It has been
specifically held that the constitutional right of confrontation does not
preclude the admission of evidence under an exception to the hearsay
rule. 5 By analogy it is submitted that necessity is also a primary
factor in granting the government its privilege of non-disclosure.
Often the -government's overriding interest in the protection of its
channels of information satisfies this element of necessity. There are,
however, situations in which the accused's right to a fair trial, or his
right to confrontation, or both, would be violated if the government
were allowed to invoke its privilege of non-disclosure.
Let us assume that an informant went with a government agent to
aid in his purchasing of illegal, non-taxed, liquor. The informant was
known to the offender and it was through his introduction that the
agent was able to consummate the purchase. At trial the agent tes-
tified as to his purchase, but refused to divulge the name of his aid.2'
In such a situation the state has in no way used the informant as a
witness against the accused. Thus, it would seem that there could
be no successful argument for disclosure, if grounded solely on the
F.2d 251 (D.C. Cir. 1947); People v. Dewson, 150 Cal. App. 2d 119, 310 P.2d 162
(1957).
13. 5 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1364-65, 1397 (3d ed. 1940).
14. 5 id. § 1420.
15. United States v. Leathers, 135 F.2d 507, 511 (2d Cir. 1943).
16. This situation was taken, though slightly modified, from the case of Crosby
v. State, 90 Ga. App. 63, 82 S.E.2d 38 (1954).
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basis of a denial of confrontation. Still, it should be evident that the
informant has done more than to merely provide a "lead."17 He is, in
fact, a material witness to the alleged crime, and may often be the
only such witness. As such, it seems clear that the accused should
be given the right to inquire of him, and if desired have him called as
a witness. To hold to the contrary would be to deprive the accused of
a material witness, thus denying his right to a fair trial1s In this and
similar situations courts often say that the informant was in truth
not just an informant, but rather a "decoy."9 Again, such is merely
a label that courts use to apply to situations in which they will compel
disclosure. It is a situation which lies midway between those in which
the informant has merely provided a "lead" and those in which he has
supplied a part of the state's proof of the case.
Let us assume that an informant was searched by a government
agent and found free of narcotics. After establishing this fact the
agent gave the informant marked money with which he was to attempt
to purchase illegal drugs. The informant did in fact buy the drugs,
and after such purchase he was again searched by the agent, the drugs
being taken for evidence and, at the same time, the seller being ar-
rested. At trial, the agent testified in full detail as to the above facts
which composed the major portion of the state's case, but refused to
disclose the name of the informant. In this and similar situations
courts are likely to say that the informant was not merely an infor-
mant, but rather a "participant," and hence disclosure should be com-
pelled.2 0 The state's evidence consisted so largely of what the infor-
mant did, that he in essence was being used as a witness against the
accused, without giving the accused the right to be faced by or to
cross-examine him. Further, the informant was both a material wit-
ness to the offense and a material element in its commission.21 Hence
to deny the accused the identity of the informant is to deny him his
basic right to a fair trial. It has been held that such a denial is a vio-
lation of due process of the law.22 These factors, the rights of confron-
17. See text supported by notes 11-12, supra.
18. Crosby v. State, 90 Ga. App. 63, 82 S.E.2d 38 (1954).
19. Id. at 64-65, 82 S.E.2d at 39.
20. See, e.g., People v. Lawrence, 149 Cal. App. 2d 435, 308 P.2d 821 (1957).
21. bid.
22. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); Gilmore v. United States,
256 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v. Conforti, 200 F.2d 365 (7th Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1952) ; United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629
(2d Cir. 1950); People v. McShann, 330 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1958); People v. Alvarez,
154 Cal. App. 2d 692, 316 P.2d 1006 (1957) (when an informant takes part in the
criminal act he is no longer an informant but becomes a material witness to the
criminal act).
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tation and fair trial, apply to the disclosure problem in a somewhat
similar, yet clearly distinguishable situation, that of entrapment.
The defense of entrapment exists where law enforcement officers
have through inducements, reasonably sufficient to overcome the re-
sistance of one not a seasoned offender, caused a person to commit a
violation of the law.23 It has been suggested that this defense is based
on the same constitutional grounds as are the unreasonable search and
seizure cases.24 It has been held that entrapment deals with the valid-
ity of a defense to a crime, rather than with the legality of the evi-
dence.25 This defense was first accepted by a federal court in the case
of Woo Wai v. United States.8- Several years later in Sorrells v. United
States,27 the Supreme Court dealt with the entrapment question. The
majority opinion adopted a test which would look toward the origin of
the criminal intent to see if an entrapment situation is present,26 while
the minority looks only to the conduct of the officers.2 9 Recently, in the
case of Shernman v. United States,30 the Supreme Court cited the lan-
guage of the Sorrells case (majority opinion) in stating that "entrap-
ment occurs only when the criminal conduct was 'the product of the
creative activity' of law-enforcement officials. ' 13 But regardless of
which line of authority is applied, an entrapment situation may well
present problems in relation to disclosure of informants' identities.
Let us assume that the government used as an informant a drug
addict, who met the accused, also a drug addict, and feigned friend-
ship. Let us further assume that the accused had been "off" drugs for
over a year and was sincerely attempting to rehabilitate himself. The
informant after repeatedly attempting to get the accused to procure
drugs for him, finally succeeded by claiming that he was in great pain
from the lack thereof. At the trial, the government introduces sub-
stantial evidence of the~illegal purchase of drugs, but when asked on
cross-examination to disclose the identity of the informant refuses,
claiming a privilege of non-disclosure. It is obvious in this case that
the accused might well want to know the identity of the informer in
order to establish the defense of entrapment.3 2 As such, it is equally
23. Wall v. United States, 65 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1933). See Donnelly, Judicial
Control Of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, And Agent Provocateurs, 60 Yale
L.J. 1091, 1098-1115 (1951).
24. Id. at 1111.
25. Ibid.
26. 233 Fed. 412 (6th Cii. 1916).
27. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
28. Id. at 445.
29. Id. at 457.
30. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
31. Id. at 372.
32. See text supported by note 23 supra.
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evident that to deprive the accused of such information is to deprive
him of a material, and perhaps essential, element of his defense. It is
in this regard, it is submitted, that a failure to require disclosure
in the instant case would be in conflict with the accused's right to con-
frontation and his right to due process in much the same manner as
has been discussed in the section of this note dealing with informant-
participants.u
The privilege against disclosure of an informant's identity is, and
should be, as applicable to the various discovery devices as at the trial
itself."
Federal and state constitutions contain provisions protecting in-
dividuals from unreasonable search and seizure by law enforcement
agencies.3 5 Unreasonable searches and seizures are those which are
neither made pursuant to a warrant nor incidentally to a valid arrest. 3
To enforce this constitutional safeguard the Supreme Court of the
United States has held that in criminal prosecutions, in federal courts,
illegally obtained evidence is inadmissible.37 A number of states have
adopted this federal rule of exclusion .38 Thus it becomes obvious that,
33. See text supported by notes 20-22 supra.
34. United States v. Schneiderman, 104 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. Cal. 1952) was a
prosecution for violation of the Smith Act. The defendant, in the preparation of
his defense, had a subpoena duces tecum issued directing the government attorney
to bring certain documents into court. The government, in response, brought in all
documents except those that might involve the danger of disclosure of informants'
identities and the court sustained this action stating that even if the informants
were to be called as prosecuting witnesses at the trial and their identity thus dis-
closed the public policy favoring their protection would preclude disclosure prior
to the time when the informants became witnesses.
It should be pointed out that this note does not concern itself with the situation
presented in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1956), which involved com-
munications to the F.B.I., made by informants, who were witnesses at trial, rather
than to the disclosure of the identity of the informants.
See United States v. Sun Oil Co, 10 F.R.D. 448 (E.D. Pa. 1950) (court re-
fused to compel disclosure of informants' identities sought through written inter-
rogatories submitted prior to trial); United States v. Lorain Journal Co., 10
F.R.D. 487 (N.D. Ohio 1950) (pre-trial motion -or discovery of names of in-
formants who complained to the government prior to initiation of civil action
charging violation of anti-trust statutes against defendant).
35. U.S. Const. Amend. IV provides: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause."
In Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), Justice Frankfurter points
out that: "the constitution of every state contains a clause like that of the
Fourteenth Amendment and often in its precise wording." Id. at 160.
36. Cannon v. United States, 158 F.2nd 952 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 330 U.S.
839 (1947).
37. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
38. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 38 (1949) indicates that the following states
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since a defendant may move to suppress or return illegally obtained
evidence under the foregoing exclusionary rule, the issue of prob-
able cause becomes an essential element of the accused's defense. 3'
Whether or not the government will be allowed the privilege of non-
disclosure, in matters involving probable cause, depends on the partic-
ular facts of a given case. The answer to this question can best be seen
by an examination of several distinct, but basic, fact situations.
Let us assume that an informant has conveyed to the police informa-
tion that on a given night X will board a plane carrying illegal gam-
bling materials. Let us further assume that the police, upon seeing X
board the plane, search his baggage and seize as evidence its illegal
contents. X at trial moves to suppress the evidence claiming unreason-
able search and seizure because of lack of probable cause. The state
then attempts to show probable cause by relying solely upon the in-
formant's communication, yet claiming that they need not reveal his
identity because of the governmental privilege as to informants.
Courts which have been confronted with this type situation are not
unanimous as to whether disclosure will be compelled.' 0 The Supreme
are in agreement with the Weeks case doctrine: Fla., Idaho, Ill., Iowa, Ky., Mich.,
Miss., Mo, Mont., Okla., S.D., Tenn, Wash., W.Va., Wis., Wyo. Also in Rickards
v. State, 6 Terry 573, 77 A.2d 199 (1950) Delaware has by decision adopted the
Weeks case view. See also, Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 531 (1956).
39. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (where in a criminal pro-
ceeding the action is based upon evidence obtained during search without warrant
the prosecution must show probable cause for conducting the search); Wilson v.
United States, 59 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1932) (prosecution for the possession of liquor
against the Democratic League of Delaware. Defendant made a motion to sup-
press the evidence on the ground that it was illegally obtained. On this motion
Wilson, a government agent, was called as a witness and he stated that he had
entered defendant's premises through the use of a key furnished by him by one
of defendant's members. On cross-examination Wilson refused to reveal the
identity of this informant. The court held him in contempt saying that if such
key were not in fact furnished by a member of the League then the evidence was
illegally obtained and thus subject to the motion to suppress).
40. Cases not requiring disclosure for admission of the evidence: McInes v.
United States, 62 F.2d 180 (9th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 616 (1933);
Shore v.,United States, 49 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 552
(1932) ; Goetz v. United States, 39 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1930); United States v.
Rogers, 53 F.2d 874 (D. N.J. 1931), afT'd sub. nom. Burkis v. United States, 60
F.2d 452 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 655 (1932); People v. Gonzales, 141 Cal.
App. 2d 604, 297 P.2d 50 (1956).
Cases requiring disclosure for admission of the evidence: McQuaid v. United
States, 198 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 929 (1953); United
States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v. Keown, 19 F.
Supp. 639 (W.D. Ky. 1937); Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1932);
United States v. Blich, 45 F.2d 627 (D. Wyo. 1930) ; Priestly v. Superior Court
33G P.2d 39 (Cal. 1958) ; Perry v. State, 150 Miss. 293, 116 So. 430 (1928) ; State
v. Edwards, 317 S.W.2d 441 (Mo. 1958); Smith v. State, 169 Tenn. 633, 90 S.W.2d
523 (1936).
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Court of the United States has, in fact, avoided any decision on this
issue in two instances."1 It is submitted that in these cases--cases in
which the informant's testimony is the sole ground for the finding of
probable cause-a failure to compel disclosure, if demanded, would be
a denial of the accused's rights to confrontation and fair trial. If the
above fact situation were modified so that the informant's information
was but a portion of the grounds of probable cause, i.e., that the police
by their own observation supplied the other portion, then we find the
courts still split as to whether disclosure will be required.42 It would
again seem that failure to require disclosure would be a violation of
the accused's rights to confrontation and fair trial. But, if we vary
the facts but one step further by assuming that the police had a suffi-
cient quantum of evidence to establish probable cause independent of
the information given by the informant, then it is clear that the courts
will not compel disclosure of the informant's identity. 43 And, it is
submitted that this is a just result, for the informant is neither being
used as a witness against the accused nor in any manner which might
affect his right to due process, a fair trial
Of similar tenor are those cases in which an unidentified inform-
ant's information is relied upon as the probable cause basis for the
arrest of the accused.
Where a search is conducted incidentally to an arrest made without
probable cause, or without a warrant based upon probable cause, it
will be held unlawful. 4" Therefore it seems that if the defendant is
attempting to establish that the arest was unlawful he should be able
to persuade the court to compel the government to disclose the identity
of the informant whose information is relied on to establish probable
cause.4 Yet, it has been held that where the arresting officer is tes-
41. Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); Segurola v. United States,
275 U.S. 106 (1927).
42. Holding disclosure necessary: United States v. Keown, 19 F. Supp. 639
(W.D. Ky. 1937) (the court must have all the facts before it to determine whether
the officer had probable cause); United States v. Blich, 45 F.2d (D. Wyo. 1930)
(officer cannot be allowed to establish probable cause on his hlanket testimony
that he was informed by a reliable person).
Holding disclosure unnecessary: United States v. Li Fat Tong, 152 F.2d 650
(2d Cir. 1945) (there is no reason to suppose that hearsay evidence derived from
an informant is not as competent evidence on which to show probable cause as
any other proof).
43. United'States v. Biahico; 189 .F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1951); Scher v. United
States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938)-; Segurola v. United States, 16 F.2d 563 (Ist Cir.
1926), aff'd, 275 U.S. 106 (1927); Harris v. State, 63 So. 2d 396 (Miss. 1953).
44. United States v. Clark, 29 F. Supp. 138 (W.D. Mo. 1939); People v. Chat-
man, 322 II. App. 519, 54 N.E.2d 631 (1944).
45. United States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 727
(1945); Segurola v. United States, 16 F.2d 563 (1st Cir. 1926), aff'd, 275 U.S.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1959/iss3/4
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tifying about the arrest to the court, disclosure will not be required if
the court is satisfied that the information was derived from a reliable
source.4 1 One case has held that discoveries made subsequent to the
arrest may confirm the existence of probable cause and thus eliminate
the necessity of disclosure. 7
Depending on the particular case, courts refer to informants as par-
ticipants, decoys, or leads. And, if a court chooses to require dis-
closure, it does so by saying that the informant was a material wit-
ness to the offense, an active participant in its accomplishment, an
essential element to the defense, or a person whose credibility in all
equity should not be accepted without the usual test of cross examina-
tion. But, it is again submitted that such phrases merely voice a con-
clusion reached by the court, that being that in the particular case an
invocation of a privilege of non-disclosure would do violation to an
accused's right to cross examine and face the witnesses against him,
the right of confrontation, and that such invocation would further do
violation to his right of due process of the law, the right to a fair trial.
There is general acceptance of the privilege of non-disclosure in
civil cases prosecuted by the government against a defendant party."
In certain instances the court may compel disclosure on the theory
that the government, by bringing the suit, has impliedly waived any
right to suppress relevant material and that the identity of informants
is included within this implied waiver.4 9 Should the court refuse to
accept the waiver theory, defendant may argue that it should be pro-
tected from the introduction of testimony of unknown witnesses and
thus move the court to compel disclosure.50
If, on the other hand, a party wishes to bring a tort action against
an informant who has informed falsely, he will not fare too well. In
suits for libel, slander, and malicious prosecution, the plaintiff will
often, and many times successfully, be met with a claim of the privi-
lege of non-disclosure. Yet it is clear that "without producing the de-
106 (1927); Hamilton v. State, 149 Miss. 251, 115 So. 427 (1928); Shields v.
State, 270 S.W.2d 367 (Tenn. 1954).
46. Simmons v. State, 281 S.W.2d 487 (Tenn. 1955).
47. People v. Gonzales, 141 Cal. App. 2d 604, 297 P.2d 50 (1956).
48. United States v. Shubert, 11 F.R.D. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (anti-trust);
Walling v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 4 F.R.D. 265 (ED.N.Y. 1943) (wage-
hour).
49. Fleming v. Bernardi, I F.R.D. 824 (N.D. Ohio 1941). Cf. United States
v. Andolschek, 142 F.2JI 503 (2d Cir. 1944) which seems to have carried this idea-
over to criminal cases, the court stating that a prosecution for crime ends any
confidential character that may be possessed by documents touching on criminal
dealings thus that disclosure will then be necessary.
50. Boudin v. Dulles, 136 F. Supp. 218 (D.C.D.C. 1955), aff'd on other grounds,
235 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955).
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fendant's words, the plaintiff has scant hope of carrying his day in
court."'
In administrative hearings, informants are used to an extent that
would not be allowed in normal courtroom proceedings.2 In many ad-
ministrative proceedings decisions are based, to a large extent, on
communications from informants,5 3 yet even when the actual commu-
nications of the informant are openly introduced into evidence the
court will often not compel the government to disclose the identity of
its informants. In many of these proceedings identity of the infor-
mant remains unknown not only to the parties thereto but also to the
deciding body before whom the proceedings are taking place.5 5 It is
true, however, that certain administrative proceedings have been nega-
tived where the accused has been denied the right to be confronted
with his accuser. " Parties before an administrative body engaged in
adjudication are ordinarily permitted to conduct cross examination, 7
therefore, the court may hold that denial of cross examination was
prejudicial error where an informant's identity was not disclosed and
played a part in determination of the decision.ss It cannot be doubted
that the fundamental concepts of fairness and due process are as ap-
plicable to administrative bodies exercising adjudicatory functions as
to criminal proceedings before judicial bodies.
It is not clear whether the courts will uphold this privilege when it
is being claimed by government .officials being examined before a
grand jury. ' In such a proceeding or in a proceeding before a legis-
51. Note, 63 Yale L.J. 206, 217 (1953).
52. See O'Brian, Loyalty Tests and Guilt by Association, 61 Harv. L. Rev. 592
(1948).
53. Bontecou, The Federal Loyalty-Security Program 60-61 (1953) points out
that the Government's employee security program has a rule of absolute secrecy
regarding the identity of confidential informants.
54. Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 454 (1920) (native-born alien prevented
from re-entry into the United States after leaving the country for trip abroad).
55. Boudin v. DulIes, 136 F. Supp. 218 (D.C.D.C. 1955), aff'd on other grounds,
235 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
See Richardson, The Federal Employee Loyalty Program, 51 Coluln. L. Rev.
546, 549 (1951); Note, 63 Yale L.J. 206, 221-22 (1953).
56. In Shaughnessy v. Mezel, 345 U.S. 206, 225 (1953), the court states that:
"[T]he right . . . to be confronted with the accuser, to cross examine informers
and to produce evidence in one's behalf, is especially necessary where the occa-
sion ... is fear of future misconduct."
57. See Administrative Procedure Act § 7(c), 60 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C.
§ 1006 (c) (1952).
58. Powhatan 'ining Co. v. Ickes, 118 F.2d 105 (6th Cir. 1941).
59. Both In re Kohn, 227 La. 246, 79 So. 2d 81 (1955) and People v. Keating,
286 App. Div. 150, 141 N.Y.S.2d 562 (1955) involved citation of a witness for
contempt of court for refusing to disclose the source of his information before
a grand jury. But it should be noted that in neither case did the court pass upon
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lative committee where the government seeks .to establish the basis for
a criminal proceeding, disclosure may be required/" It is submitted
that the privilege should be as available in this situation as in the
ordinary court proceeding, since the same public policy, that of en-
couraging communications from informants, is present. As a prac-
tical matter grand jury proceedings are not as secretive as their statu-
tory bases connote. The existence of a mere possibility that his iden-
tity will be disclosed will have a prohibitory effect on the informant
which would thus impair effective law enforcement. Also because
grand jury proceedings are not accorded the full measures of judicial
process inherent in trial proceedings," it would seem that the juridical
policy of the fair trial would not be as effective here to impair the
claim of privilege.
It is generally held that the privilege may only be invoked by a
public official acting in the performance of his duties C2 A problem
arises where the recipient of the information is not such public official
but rather the investigative -officer of a statutory 3 or ordinance-cre-
ated investigatory body. Two recent cases have denied extension of
the privilege in the latter situation holding that such an officer was too
far removed from the degree of officiality requisite to a reliance upon
the non-disclosure privilege. 6" There is no apparent reason for the
the availability of the privilege before the grand jury, the adjudgment of con-
tempt instead resting upon the lack of official government status of the person
claiming the privilege.
In Sullivan v. Hill, 73 W.Va. 49, 79 S.E. 670 (1913) a prosecuting attorney,
testifying before a legislative committee, was compelled to disclose his informa-
tion and its source regarding an alleged bribery for which criminal prosecution
was in contemplation.
60. In re Kohn, 227 La. 246, 79 So. 2d 81 (1955) (chief investigator of ordi-
nance-created investigatory body before grand jury); Sullivan v. Hill, 73 W.Va.
49, 79 S.E. 670 (1913) (prosecuting attorney before legislative committee).
61. In Gilmore v. United States, 129 F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1942), the court held
that the inquiry made by the grand jury was not a criminal prosecution within
the scope of the sixth amendment.
Cf. United States v. Costello, 221 F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1955) (holding that hear-
say evidence is sufficient to support a grand jury's indictment); In re Black,
47 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1931) (witness before grand jury not entitled to counsel);
People v. Barbour, 273 N.Y. Supp. 788, 152 Misc. 39 (1934) (the grand jury
serves merely an accusatory function).
62. Roscoe, Digest of the Law of Evidence in Criminal Cases 182 (2d ed.
1840); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2374 (3d ed. 1940).
63. The privilege extends to the identity of informants aiding investigating
officers as well as arresting officers. See Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251
(1938) ; Mitrovitch v. United States, 15 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1926) ; Goetz v. United
States, 39 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1930).
64. In re Kohn, supra note 59 (Kohn was chief investigator of a municipally
created committee which was engaged to investigate the police department He
was cited for contempt for his refusal to obey the court's order to disclose an
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courts to deny summarily the availability of the privilege in this in-
stance. These quasi-public investigatory bodies, which have govern-
mental authorization for their existence, are auxiliary to effective law
enforcement, and utilization of the informant seems, therefore, just
as necessary as in the ordinary law enforcement body.- It is sub-
mitted that for the privilege to have the salutary effect of encourage-
ment of informants, it should extend to all persons who form links
in the chain by which information is conveyed to law enforcement
agencies.
Many states have statutes which may add another basis for preven-
tion of disclosure, providing in substance that a public officer may
withhold communications made to him in official confidence. It is
arguable that this type of statute furnishes a ground upon which the
government may sustain its concealment of the identity of its infor-
mants, since these statutes refer to communications made to officials
and clearly the conveyance of an informant's name to an official is a
communication. However, this argument is substantially weakened
by the many decisions holding that such statutes are only codifications
of the traditional governmental privilege'
Occasionally, courts have analogized this privilege to the attorney-
client privilege, thus holding it personal to the informant and waiv-
able by him.- Although both privileges are used on a desire to en-
courage full disclosure, the characterization of the latter privilege as
one belonging to the communicant is illogical. This is true for a number
of reasons; fir-t, the attorney-client privilege does not usually protect
informant's Pame before the grand jury); People v. Keating, supra note -59
(Keating was employed as counsel for a private organization created at the sug-
gestion of the grand jury. He made public charges regarding police officials and
was later cited for contempt when he refused to reveal the source of his informa-
tion before the grand jury).
65. Cf. note, 46 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 843, 846-47 (1955).
66. See, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 622.11 (1950) which provides: "A public officer
cannot be examined as to communications made to him in official confidence, when
the public interests would suffer by the disclosure."
67. State v. Hoben, 36 Utah 186, 102 Pac. 1000 (1909). See also Note, 63 Yale
L.J. 206 (19-53).
68. In Steen v. First Nat'! Bank, 298 Fed. 36 (8th Cir. 1924) the plaintiff, in
an action for malicious prosecution, asked the prosecuting attorney to reveal the
identity of the informant who gave him the information to proceed against the
plaintiff in another action. Defendant objected but the court held that since
defendant had testified at a preliminary hearing to a conversation between himself
and the prosecuting attorney the privilege of non-disclosure was precluded. The
court compel!d the prosecuting attorney to reveal the identity of the informant.
Pihl v, Morris, 319 Mas;. 577, #6 N.E.2, 804 (1946) held that the identity of
an informant becomes a ratter of record when he files complaint and that in a
later action by the accused for slander and malicious prosecution the identity
nust be disclosed by the state attorney.
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the identity of the client 9 and sedondly, the attorney-client privilege
is based on the protection of a private relationship, " whereas, the
governmental privilege is based on a public relation and the policy
supporting it. Should the government official, who is the recipient of
the information, be an attorney, a court might accept this as an addi-
tional basis on which to support non-disclosure. " It is submitted, how-
ever, that this is not a valid ground upon which to extend the privilege.
When a situation exists wherein the privilege of non-disclosure is
rendered inapplicable and the government refuses the court's order
to disclose, the trial court may dismiss the action. 2 In a criminal
prosecution, if the trial court failed to require disclosure when it had
been properly demanded, there will be reversal of the conviction so
obtained.-- It is not necessary in such circumstances that the defen-
dant show this denial of disclosure was prejudicial; it is sufficient to
establish that disclosure should have been compelled.74 When the in-
formant's identity has, been disclosed through other sources, the court
may find the error harmless and refuse to upset the conviction or ad-
ministrative proceeding below.7- Where the aggrieved party fails to
demand disclosure in a situation where it is compellable, an appellate
court will not reverse." The rationale of this is that government is
under no duty to disclose voluntarily the informant's identity. When
there has been a conviction on two counts, but the sentence imposed
was not in excess of that which could have been imposed on one count,
then error in failing to require disclosure on one count will not neces-
69. Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 280 (1826); People ex rel.
Vogeistein v. Warden of County Jail, 150 Misc. 714, 270 N.Y. Supp. 363 (1934).
70. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2313 (3d ed. 1940).
71. Vogel v. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311 (1884); Ratzlaff v. State, 122 Okla. 263, 249
Pac. 934 (1926).
72. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); United States v. Keown,
19 F. Supp. 639, 646 (W.D. Ky. 1937); People Y. MeShann, 330 P.2d 33 (Cal.
1958).
73. Portomene -v. United States, 221 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1955).
74. In Portomene v. United State the court states that: "When ... a right...
is denied a defendant on trial for his liberty, it does not lie in the mouth of the
government to say that, though the court erred by depriving the defendant of the
informotion he sought and to which he was entitled, and thus visited a wrong
upon him, the conviction should nevertheless stand because the amount and extent
of the prejudice is not precisely shown. Appellate couita sit to right, not to con-
done such wrongs." 221 F.2d at 584.
75. Sorrentino v. United States, 163 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1947) (informant's
identity disclosed by other witnesses); Cannon v. United States, 158 F.2d 952
(5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 839 (1947).
76. United States v. Conforti, 200 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 925 (1953).
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sitate reversal on the second.- A governmental witness may be cited
for contempt for refusal to comply with a court's order to disclose the
identity of an informant." It is submitted that if in a given situation
certain facts are held to be so essential as to require disclosure of an
informant's identity, then a citation for contempt for refusal to dis-
close without a concomitant suppression of the evidence or dismissal
of the case would not obviate the requirement of basic fairness under-
lying this entire area of the law.
In summary, it becomes apparent that the government will be faced
with a difficult decision in any action to which it is a party. Where
the government seeks to establish its cause through information se-
cured from confidential informants, and the court or other deciding
body determines that the informant's identity is essential to a fair
disposition of the cause, the government must either disclose or forego
participation in the proceeding. The government must ascertain
which need is the greater-that of protecting its source of inforna-
tion or consummation of the pending action. That this balancing of
interests will place a substantial burden on government is not unrea-
sonable. It should be pointed out that the concealment of the identity
of these informants will, where allowed, involve some encroachment
on the rights of a party litigant to a fair trial. It is in this regard
that Justice Frankfurter's stern invocation Against allowance of the
privilege comes to mind:
The very purpose of a hearing is- to give registrants an opportu-
nity to meet adverse evidence. It makes a mockery of that pur-
pose to suggest that such adverse evidence can be effectively met
if its provenance is unknown.79
It is further evident that regardless of the terms the courts use, they
will and should require disclosure in situations where its denial
would violate an accused's right to be confronted by the witnesses
against him, or his right to a just measure of due process, a fair trial.
77. United States v. Roviaro, 229 F.2d 812 (7th Cir. 1956), rev'd on other
grounds, 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
78. Wilson v. United States, 59 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1932) (court proceeding);
In re Kohn, 227 La. 246, 79 So. 2d 81 (1955) (grand jury).
79. Justice Frankfurter dissenting in United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1,
13 (1953).
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